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Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and 
the Takings Clause 
John A. Humbach* 
"[Clhanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what 
was previously permissible no longer so."' For hundreds of 
years, as new needs have emerged, the thresholds of nuisance 
have evolved. The law of nuisance has been able to evolve, not 
just through private initiatives of litigants in court, but also 
through the democracy-driven processes of elected state legisla- 
tures. In order to protect a land developer's investment, how- 
ever, the Supreme Court decided to trim back this centuries-old 
legislative authority in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.* 
The Supreme Court decided Lwas under the "Takings Clause" 
of the United States Constitution.3 Specifically, it held that the 
Takings Clause denies state legislatures the power to augment the 
common law of nuisance if barring undesirable uses of land 
would strip the land of "all economically beneficial use."4 In 
other words, if a piece of land has no current market value except 
in uses that the legislature has found too harmful to allow, the 
state must now buy the land if it wants to prevent the harmful 
uses. 
The Court acknowledged only one exception to this "categori- 
cal rule"5 of compensation for such "total takings."6 The excep- 
* Professor of Law, Pace University. J.D. 1966 Ohio State University College of Law; 
B.A. 1963 hliami University. 
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992). 
2. Id. The factual background of the case is set forth infra text accompanying notes 17- 
22. 
3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads: "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4. Lucar. 112 S. Ct. at 2900. 
5. Id. at 2899. The Court described this "categorical treatment" of total-value regula- 
tory takings as one of "at least two discrete categories of regulatory action [recognized] as 
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of 
the restraint," The other category consists of regulations that force an "owner to suffer a 
physical 'invasion' of his property." Id, at 2893. 
6. I.e., takings in which a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial or  
productive use of land." See id. at 2893, 2901. 
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tion applies to use restrictions that merely mimic common law 
limits on land use that already "inhere in the title itself."' The 
Court reasoned that such inherent limits on landowner auton- 
omy, imposed under "background principles of the State's law of 
property and nuisance,"S are "proscribed use interests [that] 
were not a part of .  . . title to begin with."g Therefore, state legis- 
latures can still forbid such deleterious uses, even to the point of 
total takings, but only if they "do no more than duplicate the re- 
sult that could have been achieved in the courts."1° The constitu- 
tional scope of the legislative power has become, at least for total 
takings of land,ll a matter of state common law. 
7. Id. at 2900. 
8. Id 
9. Id at 2899. 
10. Id. at 2900. 
11. The Lucas opinion suggests in dicta that the Takings Clause does not necessarily 
protect personal property to the same degree that it protects real property. The Court 
explained that "in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high 
degree of control over commercial dealings, [the owner] ought to be aware of the possibil- 
ity that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless." Id at 
2899. 
The Court in Lucas had, of course, little choice but to distinguish personal property from 
real property: if it applied the Lucas rule to both, it would virtually overrule the whole body 
of constitutional law upholding statutory forfeiture as a means to prevent "undesirable" 
uses of chattels. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926) (upholding forfeiture of 
automobile used in unlawful transportation of liquor). See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688, 690 (1974) (upholding forfeiture of an innocent 
owner's yacht used in drug transport); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 
(1921) (upholding forfeiture of innocent owner's automobile used in aid of tax evasion). 
The Supreme Court admits "the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of traditional 
forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. U.S. 
Coin & Currency. 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971). In fact. "legitimate governmental interests" 
or "legitimate purposes" can justify total takings of private property, with no requirement 
whatever that the undesirable uses being attacked be nuisances, noxious, or malum in se. 
CaZero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688, 690 (1974). See also United States v. $8,850,461 U.S. 555, 
562 n.12 (1983) ("important governmental purposes"). 
The Supreme Court justifies the constitutionality of statutory forfeiture on the basis, 
simply, that "state lawmakers, in the exercise of the police power, [are] free to determine 
that certain uses of property [are] undesirable" and then adopt confiscation as a "secon- 
dary defense against a forbidden use." Caho-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686 (quoting Van Oster, 
272 U.S. at 467). Accord, Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 513 ("It is the illegal use that is the 
material consideration, . . . the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental."). Statu- 
tory forfeiture is a clear modem example of the public interest justifying total takings of 
innocent owners' property irrespective of fault, breach of duty, wrongdoing, or illegality 
on the owners' part. 
Before Lucas the Supreme Court had not suggested that the Takings Clause afforded any 
less protection to personal property than to real property. Thus, the Luras dictum to that 
effect, if it endures, is another significant innovation for takings law. With this new distinc- 
tion, the Supreme Court has made it easier for litigants to challenge environmental, 
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The Supreme Court's new common law test of legislative valid- 
ity is a major analytical innovation. Historically, it was "the great 
office of statutes . . . to remedy defects in the common law," 
adapting the common law "to the changes of time and circum- 
stances."12 After Lucas, however, remedial statutes to improve 
the common law will now be subject to preemption by the com- 
mon law. Such preemption is effectively mandated whenever the 
case is one of total taking and the reviewing judge disagrees with 
the legislature's balancing of the values and interests that bear on 
determinations of nuisance. Ironically, future legislative efforts to 
remedy deficiencies in the common law of nuisance can now be 
overturned precisely because the common law fails to protect peo- 
ple from the particular harm in question. 
In decreeing this extraordinary reversal of centuries-old roles, 
the Supreme Court has reassigned a significant piece of the na- 
tion's ultimate land-use law authority from elected state legisla- 
tures to the judiciary. The courts, under the pretext of 
"regulatory takings" review,l3 will now have the final say on sub- 
stantive questions of right and wrong when it comes to the uses of 
land. Given the potential liabilities involved,l4 one possible effect 
of Lucas may be to stunt, if not arrest, the evolution of statutory 
protections from nuisance-like and other detrimental uses of 
land. As the author of Lucas declared in a dissent to another opin- 
ion handed down on the same day as Lucas, the "more natural 
direction" of the Supreme Court's temptation is "towards system- 
atically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it suc- 
cumbs. . . . The Imperial Judiciary lives."l5 
growth management, and historic preservation laws without casting the least shadow of 
"takings" doubt on chattel forfeiture as a law-and-order weapon in the war against crime. 
12. hlunn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113. 134 (1876). 
13. A so-called "regulatory taking" may occur when a law or regulation effectively takes 
away property rights by, for example, restricting the uses that owners may make of their 
land. Since 1922, all laws and regulations have been subject to regulatory takings review 
in the courts. See infra text accompanying notes 96-128. The criteria used in this judicial 
supervision of the legislative function have been notoriously vague, making the reviews 
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
14. If a statute is adopted in good faith and a court later decides that the statute goes 
further than the common law of nuisance and effects a total taking as well, "no subsequent 
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period 
during which the taking was effective." Id at 2901 n.17 (quoting First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)). 
15. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874, 2882 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Although the Lucas majority opinion revealed no similar sharp 
concern about judicial trenching on the legislative branch, the 
most important question decided in Lucas was the institutional 
one: which governmental forum should ultimately determine 
whether, weighing the public interest against competing private 
interests, the negative effects of a given land use are too socially 
intolerable to allow? This institutional question is arguably the 
only truly general question of the entire "regulatory takings" de- 
bate, the myriad specific disputes over particular kinds of regula- 
tions and properties being, in the end, merely "ad hoc, factual 
inquiries ." 16 
This article reviews the historical tradition in which the com- 
mon law core of nuisance has been the frequent subject of statu- 
tory additions and refinements, providing most of our modern 
law of land use and environmental protection. Until Lucas, the 
Takings Clause had not been treated as a charter establishing the 
courts as boards of revision to rethink and selectively veto legisla- 
tive determinations in the land use field. Within the scope of "to- 
tal takings," however, Lucas has converted the Takings Clause 
from its original meaning and made it exactly that. 
The Lucas case arose when the owner of beachfront property 
challenged the constitutionality of the South Carolina Beachfront 
Management Act ("the Act").'' The South Carolina Legislature 
adopted the Act to prevent a number of negative impacts - 
safety, economic, and environmental - that may result from 
building on beaches and dunes.18 The specific provision in con- 
16. Lulas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
17. S.C. CODE ANN. $9 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. 1992). 
18. The Legislature's key findings in support of the Act are set forth in Lucac, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2896 n.lO. Building houses on eroding beaches is not just personal folly; such houses 
can have harmful impacts on other people as well. Structures at the ocean's edge interrupt 
the natural protection that migrating dunes otherwise provide to communities farther in- 
land. The houses themselves can disintegrate in major storms, their debris becoming 
windborne missiles that endanger the lives and property of others. In addition, every ma- 
jor coastal humcane seems to bring still another call on the taxpayers to furnish disaster 
relief to owners wiped out at the shore. See generally Natasha Zalkin, Comment, Shifting 
Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's 
Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205, 211-16 (1991); Frank E. Maloney & Anthony J. 
O'Donnell, Jr., Drawing the Line at the Oceanfront: The Role of Coastal Constnution Setback Lines 
in Regulating Development of the Coastal Zone, 30 FLA. L. REV. 383, 389-91 (1978). 
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troversy prohibited owners from constructing new houses sea- 
ward of a defined setback line. Approximately two years before 
this building prohibition was adopted, Mr. Lucas had paid nearly 
one million dollars for two beachfiont lots, both of which were 
entirely within the new "no-build" zone. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Mr. Lucas's tak- 
ings claim, pointing out that the Legislature's objectives (the 
soundness of which were not contested) fell well within long- 
standing legislative authority to forbid conduct that may cause se- 
rious public harm.lg Mr. Lucas took his case to the United States 
Supreme Court, arguing that the Takings Clause requires com- 
pensation to be paid when a land-use regulation "totally elimi- 
nates the value of private pr~perty."~O The Court agreed - 
except when "background principles of the State's law of prop- 
erty and nuisance"21 would provide a basis for banning the land 
use anyway. The Court remanded the case for a determination of 
whether the South Carolina building ban came within such "back- 
ground principles."22 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical 
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of 
principles of policy which are other than those on which the 
particular right is founded . . . . The limits set to property by 
other public interests present themselves as a branch of what is 
called the police power of the State.23 
19. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd and re- 
manded, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
20. Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at i, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 
S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453). 
21. Luras, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. 
22. Id at 2901-02. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Mr. Lucas 
had "suffered a temporary taking deserving of compensation." Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, No. 91-453, at 5 (S.C. Nov. 20, 1992) (order on remand). On the issue of 
"background principles" the court simply concluded, without elaboration, that the 
"Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could 
restrain Lucas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common 
law principle." Id at 4. It further remanded the case to the trial court where, it held, the 
"sole issue. . . is a determination of the actual damages Lucas has sustained as the result of 
his being temporarily deprived of the use of his property." Id 
23. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.). 
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Restricting the uses of private property under the police power 
is one of the primary ways that the government carries out its es- 
sential purpose of preserving the general welfare.24 The govern- 
ment has "unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner 
from using his property to injure others without having to com- 
pensate the value of the forbidden use."25 
Every time a legislative body exercises the police power to add 
or remove a restriction on property use, it redefines property 
rights.26 When new restrictions narrow the scope of private land- 
use autonomy, incidental impacts on private wealth are likely to 
result. The people whose wealth is affected naturally tend to ask 
why. On what grounds does the government tell people they can- 
not fill in their own wetlands, kill snails on their own land, or 
move the mirrors in their own theaters?27 What objectives, in 
other words, qualify as legitimate police power objectives author- 
izing the legislature to redefine private property rights?28 
24. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 (1987). 
25. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 51 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also infra note 43 (quoting 
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Keystone majority). 
Even John Locke, for whom the "great and chief end" of government was "the preserva- 
tion of .  . . property," agreed that "[p]olitical power . . . [is] a right of making laws [with 
penalties] for the regulating and preserving of property . . . ." 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREA- 
n s ~ s  OF GOVERNMENT $8 3, 124 (Everyman's Library 1991) (1690) (emphasis added). 
Locke observed that "it would be a direct contradiction for any one to enter into society 
with others for the securing and regulating of property, and yet to suppose his land . . . 
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he himself, and the 
property of the land, is a subject." 2 Id. 8 120 (emphasis added). 
26. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
27. See Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990) (wetlands); Cath- 
erine Yang with Peter Hong. The Grass is Looking Greener for Landowners, Bus. WK., July 13, 
1992, at 31 (endangered Kanab amber snails); United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991) (theater mirrors). 
28. A major factor in the current "property rights" debate is many people's honest be- 
lief that there is no real social harm in doing such things as destroying wetlands, extermi- 
nating entire species, or wrecking our nation's cultural legacy. Not so long ago, after all, 
wetlands were just swamps, wildlife was mainly an annoyance, and old buildings were 
merely in the way. People who form expectations and make investments based on views 
that are becoming outmoded can, when brought up short by new social values, feel greatly 
disappointed.   he problem is one of transition, though being merely transitional does not 
make the problem less real. 
For a good Legal Realist analysis of how judges behave in deciding takings cases impli- 
cating social values that are in transition, see John R. Nolon, Footprints in the Shifiing Sandc of 
the Isle of P a l m  A Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE &  EN^. L. 1, 
16-19 passim (1992). 
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A. Proper L.e@lutive Objectives for Redefining Property Rights: 
Nuisance vs. Other Undesirable Conduct 
The common law of nuisance has long been relevant to takings 
analysis because, by definition, property ownership does not in- 
clude the right to create unlawful nuisances. The Supreme Court 
applied this principle in Lucas when it acknowledged that its "cat- 
egorical rule" for "total takings" does not apply to restrictions 
merely mimicking those that already "inhere in the title itself."*g 
The principle's application is, however, broader. . Because "back- 
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance"30 
shape the contours of constitutional "title," the question whether 
a statutorily restricted use could be banned as a common law nui- 
sance is a "logically antecedent inquiry"31 for every regulatory 
takings case. In essence, the law of nuisance provides a common 
law immunity from takings challenges. 
Far more importantly, the common law of nuisance has long 
given "a fairly helpful clew" on the validity of statutory land-use 
restrictions that augment existing common law.S2 The common 
law of nuisance has historically been consulted, however, "not for 
the purpose of controlling" the question of validity, but only "for 
the helpful aid of its ana l~g ies . "~~  Indeed, if legislative restric- 
tions on land use were only valid if based on some specific com- 
mon law nuisance precedent, the legislated evolution of nuisance 
thresholds could not occur at all. Such a requirement would dis- 
rupt the vital legislative function of modiEying and supplementing 
the common law when the latter proves inadequate to meet 
changing needs.34 
Nevertheless, the very breadth of the "multifaceted health, wel- 
29. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). See supra 
text accompanying notes 5-1 1. 
30. Id. at 2900. 
31. Id at 2899. 
32. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
33. Id 
34. The very existence of extensive legislated land use restrictions is strong evidence of 
the common law's inadequacy to meet changing needs. In their thorough national review 
of zoning developments since Euclid, Beuscher and Momson found little basis for conclud- 
ing that nuisance law is adequate to protect property owners in unzoned areas, noting that, 
"[oln the whole one who moves to the open unzoned country is certainly taking his 
chances." Jacob H. Beuscher &Jerry W. Momson, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance 
Cases, 1955 WIS. L. REV. 440, 447,457. See inza note 131 for related discussion. 
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fare and safety" aspects of the police power35 suggests to some 
that legislatures' power to reduce property values cannot be "co- 
terminous with the police power itself."36 Chief Justice Rehn- 
quist, for example, has seemed inclined to confine non- 
compensatory use restrictions to a "nuisance exception" resting 
on "discrete and narrow purposes"37 and only allowing govern- 
ment to prevent "misuse or illegal use" of property.38 
In Lucas, however, the Supreme Court rejected any such narrow 
version of the legislative power to regulate uses of landsg (except 
for cases of "total takings"). It explained that references in ear- 
lier cases to "some objective conception of 'noxiousness' " were 
L 6 simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements 
that 'land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially 
advance[s] legitimate state interests' . . . . ' " 4 0  The Court noted 
that its cases "have made clear . . . that a broad range of govern- 
mental purposes and regulations satisfjl these  requirement^."^^ 
35. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987) (Rehn- 
quist, C.J., dissenting). The police power is "one of the most essential of powers, at times 
the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government." 
District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909). "Public safety, public health, 
morality, peace and quiet, law and order - these are some of the more conspicuous exam- 
ples of the traditional application." Bennan v. Parker, 349 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
36. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). See also Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 906 (S.C. 1991) (Hanvell, J., d' went- 
ing) (contending that regulation of land-use activities may require compensation unless 
the prohibited activities are "similar to public nuisances"); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 21 C1. Ct. 161, 167 (1990) (requiring compensation for diminished land 
value caused by a ban on rock mining because rock mining "is not considered a nuisance 
in this area"); William G. Laffer 111, The Private Property Rights Act: Forcing Federal Reguhtions 
to Obey the Bill ofRights, 173 HERITAGE FOUND. REP. ISSUE BULL. 1 ,3  (Apr. 3, 1992) (stating 
that landowners have the right to engage in particular land-use activities unless the activi- 
ties are defined as "trespass or  nuisance" under the common law). 
37. Kqstone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
38. Id at 512. The ChiefJustice drew the "misuse or illegal use" test from an arguendo 
discussion in Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78,86 (191 1) (holding that the Secretary of Inte- 
rior did not have the power to limit uses of private inholdings in Yosemite Park). Besides 
being dictum, the curtin "misuse or  illegal use" test is alsocircular. All uses banned by 
legislation are by definition illegal and thus are misuses of property - provided the legis- 
lation is valid, which is of course precisely the point at issue. To  accept the Curtin dictum 
on its face would confirm the constitutional justifiability of any land-use restriction whose 
violation the legislature has declared to be an illegal use and, hence, a misuse of land. 
39. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the opinion, perhaps a sign of tempering of his 
previously stated views, referred to in the preceding two footnotes and accompanying text. 
40. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) (quoting 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)). 
41. Id. (quoting Nolhn, 483 U.S. at 834-35). 
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Indeed, no such narrow reading of state legislatures' land-use 
powers, limiting them to re-enacting the common law of nui- 
sance, is supported by precedent. While some land-use regula- 
tions upheld against takings challenge may have rested on 
discrete and narrow purposes, the same can scarcely be said of 
the whole wide array of safety, health, aesthetic, and even lifestyle 
objectives that have been validly advanced under the police 
power.42 The Court has plainly acknowledged that legislatures 
have greater power by using language such as "akin to a public 
nuisance" and "nuisance-like" to describe kinds of land uses a 
legislature may restrict,43 and by declaring it unnecessary to 
"weigh with nicety" the question of whether a particular re- 
stricted use was a nuisance according to the common law.44 Even 
more to the point, the Court has consistently upheld legislatures' 
power to restrict a wide variety of undesirable uses and activities 
not considered nuisances at common law, such as siting adult the- 
aters in certain locations,45 trading in eagle feathers,46 building 
houses on lots smaller than one to five acresY4' permitting three 
or more unrelated tenants to share a single-family houseY48 min- 
ing gravel,49 leaving timber scraps on the ground,50 constructing 
tall buildings,51 selling water interstate,52 and manufacturing and 
selling margarine53 and alcoholic beverages.54 
In sum, the historic breadth of the legislative power to restrict 
uses of property without compensation seems to have extended, 
potentially, to any use the legislature deemed likely to harm other 
persons or the community as a whole. The Supreme Court in Lu- 
42. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (aesthetics); 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (family lifestyle); other cases cited infia notes 45- 
54. 
43. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488, 491 n.20 
(1987). As Justice Stevens wrote: "[Nlo individual has a right to use his property so as to 
create a nuisance or ofhenuke harm others." Id. (emphasis added). 
44. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,280 (1928) (upholding uncompensated destruction 
of cedar trees to protect nearby apple trees owned by others). 
45. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
46. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
47. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
48. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
49. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
50. Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919). 
51. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). 
52. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). 
53. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
54. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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cm confirmed this broad reach of legislative authority, except for 
lands whose sole market value is for uses too harmful to allow. 
B. Common Law Nuisances 
Impetus for linking legislative land-use powers more closely to 
common law nuisance seems to stem from at least two considera- 
tions. One is the search for limiting principles to narrow the 
range of permissible non-compensable regulations so that not 
every law to advance public welfare will be ipso facto insulated 
from the Constitution's compensation requiremen~~5 The other 
is to avoid placing uncompensated burdens on people who have 
committed no wrong and only want to use their own property in 
ways that are not noxious or dangerous, or otherwise a "misuse" 
of land.56 
The notion that nuisance law can provide a suitable exogenous 
anchor for takings law is unrealistic. Far from being a likely 
source of definition or scope, the common law of nuisance is itself 
an "impenetrable jungle."57 The problem is not that common 
law nuisance presents many difficult borderline cases, an illusory 
objection that Professor Epstein properly refutes.5* The problem 
inheres in the very nature of common law nuisance as a body of, 
law. It is not a set of flat prohibitions against various deleterious 
activities or blameworthy conduct. It is, instead, a multi-factored 
balancing process for deciding which harms to prohibit. 
Nuisance law starts from an implicit assumption that uses of 
land may have detrimental effects on others but still not necessar- 
ily be either socially intolerable or in any sense blame~orthy.~g A 
legal rule that tried to prohibit all detrimental effects of land use 
would be not only highly impractical but, probably, an economic 
disaster. Therefore, when people suffer harm caused by others' 
55. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying notes 35-38. 
56. Id at 512. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting). 
57. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS $86, at 616 
(5th ed. 1984). 
58. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO- 
MAIN 115-21 (1985). 
59. As the Restatement explains, "Practically all human activities unless camed on in a 
wilderness interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference." RE- 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $4 822 cmt. g (1979). In the Restatement's terminology. only 
those uses of land with deleterious effects that are both "significant" and "unreasonable" 
can be considered unla~vful as nuisances. Id 38 821B. 821F, 822(a). 826. 
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land uses, there is often no sensible policy choice but to decide 
that, on balance, the public interest is best advanced by allowing 
the uses (such as important industries) to proceed despite their 
harmful effects on neighbors or the community at large. 
Legal rights to use property in ways that incidentally harm in- 
nocent others are, as a result, well known in our law - they are 
the essence of the principle of aizmnum absque inz.~ria.~O Even sub- 
stantial harms can be lawhlly visited on others (for example, 
flooding neighbors by diverting surface water) or on the commu- 
nity (demolishing an inspirational landmark or permitting smoke- 
stack emissions that cause acid rain), depending on the policy 
judgments and choices reflected in the applicable law.61 Tolerat- 
ing such rights to cause harm is, as a practical matter, unavoida- 
ble, but it does not follow that such rights should ever be 
constitutionally inviolable. They must, instead, be variable, evolv- 
ing with changing times and circumstance. 
The common law of public nuisance and of private nuisance 
together provide frameworks for varying the outer contours of 
property rights to use land. When particular land uses produce 
negative impacts on neighboring uses or conflict with other pri- 
vate or societal goals, judges use these frameworks to help them 
determine whether or not the negative impacts or conflicts are 
too harmful, on balance, to tolerate. 
For example, the common law ofprivate nuisance is not a de- 
fined catalog of noxious, reprehensible, or even merely forbidden 
behavior but is, instead, an essentially relativistic concept.62 A 
nuisance, the Supreme Court has said, "may be merely a right 
thing in the wrong place - like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard."63 The decision whether particular conduct qualifies as 
a private nuisance depends not only on its location and surround- 
ings, but also on whether "the gravity of the harm caused out- 
60. Loss, hurt, or  harm without a legally recognized injury. 
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978) (surface water); Hatch v. W.S. 
Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) (noise, fumes, bright lights); Bove v. Donner-Hanna 
Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (heavily polluting coke plant across 
from residence). 
62. Seegenerally KEETON et al., supra note 57, at 619-33. The Restatement of Torts espresses 
this relativistic character by stating that interference with others' land use can be a nui- 
sance if, among other things, "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's 
conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 826(a) (1979). 
63. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
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weighs the utility of the c0nduct,"6~ or on an even more complex 
weighing of various factors that are normal concomitants of pri- 
vate nuisance tests.65 
The common law ofpublic nuisance is, if anything, even more 
indeterminate than private nuisance in the range of behavior to 
which it can potentially apply. Over 700 years ago, Bracton ob- 
served that "nuisances are truly infinite."66 In the eighteenth 
century, public nuisance was defined as "a species of offenses 
against the public order and oeconomical regimen of the state; 
being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of the king's 
subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing that the common good 
requires."67 
As the range of public nuisance developed, it grew to be essen- 
tially co-extensive with the police power itself - potentially en- 
compassing any act or omission that "injuriously affects the 
safety, health or morals of the public,"68 or acts that "endanger or 
injure the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable 
number of persons."69 According to the Second Restatement of 
Torts, a public nuisance can be any act that significantly interferes 
with public health, safety, peace, comfort, or con~enience.~~ If 
64. KEETON et a].. supra note 57, at 630. 
65. See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, bent, and 
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 212-14, 234-36 (1990). 
66. HENRY DE BRACTON, 3 ON THE L\VS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 189 (Samuel E. 
Thome trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1569) ("noncmenta vero inanita sunt"). 
67. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 167. Accord 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREA- 
nsE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 197-200 (Amo Press 1972) (1724). According to Haw- 
kins, the 1724 list of indictable public nuisances included such noisome uses as "common 
Bawdy-houses." gaming houses, and stages for rope-dancers, as well as interfering with 
public rights of way by laying logs in a navigable public river. Id at 198. It also included 
various right-thing-in-the-wrong-place nuisances such as a swineyard in town, "divid[ing] 
a House in a Town for poor People to inhabit in, by reason whereof it will be more danger- 
ous in the Time of Infection of the Plague," a brew-house "erected in such an inconve- 
nient Place, wherein the Business cannot be carried on without greatly incommoding the 
Neighbourhood," or a common play-house "if it draw together such Numbers of Coaches 
or People, etc. as prove generally inconvenient to the Places adjacent." Id. at 198-99. 
68. Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry., 205 S.W. 581, 583 (Ky. 
1918). 
69. See, e.g., Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977). 
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 821B(2)(a) (1979). Like private nuisance analy- 
sis, the law of public nuisance is relativistic, as memorably expressed in the early case that 
refused to treat air pollution from candle making as a nuisance because "[lie utility del 
chose excusera le noisomeness del stink," id. 9 826 cmt. a (quoting an unnamed case 
quoted in JAMES F. STEPHEN. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 106 
(Fred. B. Rothman & Co. 1985) (1890)). But rf. infra text accompanying notes 78-82 (not- 
ing that a balancing of utilities may not be appropriate in the public nuisance context). 
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the Court's goal in Lucas was to confine the range of permissible 
total takings to something less than the full breadth of the police 
power, the common law of public nuisance hardly seems to pro- 
vide the narrowing principles it sought. 
The only objective feature that common law nuisance cases 
seem to share is that somebody did something, not otherwise a 
tort or crime, whose consequences had negative effects on 
others.71 Nuisance, "as a general term, describes the consequences 
of conduct, the inconveniences to others, rather than the type of 
conduct involved."72 Common law nuisance has never confined 
courts to a reiteration of past cases declaring certain past uses to 
be nuisances. Before the common law of nuisance can supply tak- 
ings analysis with objective parameters to limit the breadth of leg- 
islative powers, nuisance law itself must first be reoriented and, 
probably, petrified. 
Perhaps because the path of common law nuisance can lead to 
such a wide range of prohibitable land uses, the Supreme Court 
took pains to caution state courts not to feel overly free in letting 
their local common law evolve. It stressed that a decree that elim- 
inates all economically beneficial uses may be "defended" only on 
the basis of an "objectively reasonable application of relevant prece- 
dent"73 and cited several factors from the Second Restatement of 
Torts version of nuisance law as "things" that total takings analysis 
will "ordinarily entai1."74 
Apparently concerned that the Restatement factors may not suffi- 
ciently constrain future common-law developments, the Court 
suggested two further "facts" that "ordinarily import[] a lack of 
71. CJ KEETON et al., supra note 57, at 619 ("The essence of a private nuisance is an 
interjerence." (emphasis added)). 
72. Copart Zndus., 362 N.E.2d at 971 (emphasis added). After reviewing numerous ex- 
amples Dean Prosser concluded that "nuisance, in short, is not conduct, nor is it even a 
condition. It is the invasion of an interest, a type of harm or damage . . . ." William L. 
Prosser, Pn'vate Actions for Public Nukance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1004 (1966). See also RE- 
~FATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. § 821A cmt. c (1979) ("as used in the Restatement, 'nui- 
sance' does not signify any particular kind of conduct on the part of the defendant"). 
73. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 n.18 (1992). 
74. Id at 2901: "The 'total taking' inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the 
application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things, the 
degree of harm to public lands and resources, or  adjacent private property, posed by the 
claimant's activities, . . . the social value of the claimant's proposed activities and their 
suitability to the locality in question, . . . and the relative ease with which the alleged harm 
can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent 
landowners) alike . . . ." (citations omitted). 
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any common-law prohibition."75 One is the "fact that a particular 
use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners." The 
other is the "fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are 
permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant."76 
Whether state courts will actually be required to give major 
weight to these two additional "facts" (where present) is unclear. 
If, as the Court insisted, "the question . . . is one of state law,"77 
then it should be up to state courts to decide how much weight, if 
any, such factors should have. 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court, in its effort to de- 
fine nuisance with paraphrases from the Second Restatement of Torts 
plus these two additional factors, did not necessarily exhaust the 
relevant "background principles" of nuisance, especially of public 
nuisance. The cited Restatement  provision^,^^ for example, reflect 
the Restatement's private tort orientation and, accordingly, stress a 
"balance of utilities" approach that bases determinations of nui- 
sance on whether "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of 
the actor's conduct."79 It is, however, highly debatable whether 
any such private-tort balancing of utilities is proper in the public 
nuisance context.80 The reason is that public nuisance enforce- 
ment is essentially an exercise of the state's police power, and the 
public welfare it aims to protect is not just another interest in a 
mix with competing private concerns.S1 In the post-Lucas period, 
therefore, the most important "background principle" of nui- 
sance law may be the one that the Supreme Court adopted when, 
long before Lucas, it rejected any simple "balancing of utilities" 
for public nuisance cases brought by a state: 
This court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm 
that will be done by an injunction against that of which the 
plaintiff complains, that it would have in deciding between two 
subjects of a single political power. Without excluding the con- 
75. Lutac, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (emphasis added). 
76. Id 
77. Id (emphasis added). 
78. See supra note 74. 
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 826(a) (1979). 
80. For a fine discussion of this and other confusions between public and private nui- 
sance law, see Robert Abrams &Val Washington, The Misunhtood Law offiblic Nuisance: A 
Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer. 54 ALB. L. REV. 358, 377-78 
passim (1990). 
81. Id. at 378. As the Court wrote in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237-38 (1907): "The states, by entering the Union, did not sink to the position of private 
owners, subject to one system of private law." 
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siderations that equity always takes into account, we cannot 
give the weight that was given them in argument to a compari- 
son between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and the ca- 
lamity of a possible stop to the defendants' business . . . .s2 
Like the balancing test, the two additional "facts" cited in Lucas 
as "ordinarily" indicative of nuisance also appear to be incom- 
plete expressions of the background principles that they repre- 
sent. The idea, for example, that state courts must allow people 
to undertake particular activities just because they have "long 
been engaged in" by others is inconsistent with the tradition of 
nuisance law as a flexible body of legal responses. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court itself contradicted such a notion when it observed 
that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what 
was previously permissible no longer s0."83 
Similarly, the significance of the fact that "other landowners . . . 
are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant" is 
greatly tempered by equity's longstanding concern with relative 
hardships4 - a concern that often suggests that existing uses 
should, in fairness, be treated less strictly than uses that are 
merely proposed.85 Destroying an investment in an existing land 
use that has since been deemed "undesirable" typically works a 
far greater burden on the affected owners than merely prohibiting 
the establishment of new detrimental land uses. A landowner 
who is forbidden to commence a new use and a landowner who is 
not permitted to continue an existing use are never really quite 
"similarly situated." 
The key word in all of this is "ordinarily" - that the treatment 
of "similarly situated owners ordinan'ly imports a lack of any com- 
mon-law prohibition."86 When ongoing activities are permitted 
to continue, it is ordinarily a fair and natural presumption that the 
activities produce no undue harm (if, indeed, they produce any 
harm at all). Or, in a somewhat different vein, one may ordinarily 
82. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 239 (granting injunction against a 
polluting factory whose sulphurous fumes caused and threatened damage to "forests and 
vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff state"). 
83. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 827 cmt. g (1979)). 
84. See HENRY L. ~~CCLINTOCK, EQUITY $ 5  144-45 (2d ed. 1948). 
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 941 (1979). CJ, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Ce- 
ment Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,872 (N.Y. 1970) (refusing to enjoin a polluting activity on the 
grounds that, although the $45,000,000 factory had caused substantial damage, there was 
a "large disparity in the economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction"). 
86. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) (emphasis 
added). 
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presume that merely stopping one actor while letting others con- 
tinue serves no purpose because the harm supposedly being ad- 
dressed would end up occurring anyway.87 
Any such natural presumptions about the "ordinary" case are, 
however, equally naturally rebuttable. When, for example, the 
observed results of land-use activities are themselves the cause 
for alarm (as, for example, in the cases of filling of wetlands, de- 
struction of habitat, and pollution of reservoirs), the fact that the 
particular activities were lawful in the past does not, in itself, be- 
come a permanent justification for their continuation. On the 
contrary, the fact that observed consequences of particular land- 
use activities impelled the legislature to move against them is a 
sign that non-"ordinary" circumstances are present. It is, after 
all, still a comparatively rare event for legislatures to ban previ- 
ously lawful uses of land.S8 
Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court will let "back- 
ground principles of state property and nuisance"s9 law freely 
evolve in their new constitutional role, or whether their evolution 
will be hemmed and hobbled by federally-enforced "objectively 
reasonable application of relevant precedents."gO The latter al- 
ternative, which is possible if state law developments seem too 
liberal, would amount to the creation of a supervening federal law 
of akmnum absque injuria to protect private owners' rights to en- 
gage in harm-producing uses of land. 
87. Two situations must be carefully distinguished. One is the case mentioned in the 
text, in which particular land-use activities that could be viewed as deleterious in another 
context are permitted because the goals of a prohibition cannot (or can no longer) be 
accomplished. For example, it would be pointless to prohibit a Manhattan construction 
project in order to preserve a potential habitat for large mammalian species that disap- 
peared from the city long ago. 
This is, however, very different from a case in which a prospective polluter claims a 
freedom from use regulations on the ground that her discrete addition to the existing load 
would be too negligible to matter. Such "deaths of a thousand cuts" are the classic way 
that environmental resources degrade or vanish, and there may be no logical place to draw 
the line except at the point to which things have progressed when the need for a response 
is perceived. The legislature may not wish (or be able) to undo the "cuts" that have al- 
ready occurred, but it should not for that reason forfeit its ability to prevent further re- 
source degradation. 
88. New enactments of local zoning laws and the downzoning of areas to less intensive 
uses probably represent the most frequent instances of legislatures banning previously 
lawful land uses. For any given piece of land, however, the imposition of a new zoning law 
usually happens only once, and~subsequent downzonings of the land - though they can 
occur - are relatively rare occurrences. 
89. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. 
90. Id. at 2902 n.18 (emphasis omitted). 
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C. Statutory Nuisances: Redefining The "Rights to Harm 0 t h ~ "  
As knowledge, needs, and social values evolve with time and 
changed circumstances, what once seemed innocuous may grow 
noxious, while the noxious may become benign. A century ago, 
for example, beer and margarine were considered harmful 
enough substances to justify a legal ban, while opiates were sold 
without prescription and Coca-Cola contained cocaine.g1 The 
valued wetlands of today were the noisome swamps and bogs of 
yesteryear. Beaches and riverbanks, once thought the perfect 
place for a house, are now viewed in hindsight, after disastrous 
floods, in a very different way. As conditions change with the 
times, so do the thresholds of socially intolerable conduct, includ- 
ing uses of land. 
For hundreds of years, both legislatures and the courts have 
had the power to declare new kinds of nuisances as new needs 
became evident.92 Indeed, for public nuisance - an indictable 
offense93 - it has been long regarded as a classically legislative 
function to determine "what the interests of the public require" 
and "what measures are necessary for the protection of such in- 
terests."94 Most of the historic range of public nuisance, like 
other common law crimes, is now encompassed in various statu- 
tory offenses.95 In fact, the common law crime of public nuisance, 
rather than the tort of private nuisance, is more naturally re- 
garded as the pre-statutory ancestor of most land-use regulations 
today - especially those whose violation is indictable and enjoin- 
91. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (margarine); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887) (beer); United States v. Housley, 751 F. Supp. 1446. 1447 (D. Nev. 1990) 
(noting that Coca-Cola "once contained a small amount of cocaine"); TROY DUSTER, THE 
L E G ~ ~ L A ~ ~ N  OF ~ O R A L I T Y  3-15 (1970) (discussing the prevalence and effects of over-the- 
counter sales of narcotics until such sales were prohibited in 1914); RONALD HAMOIW, 
DEALING WITH DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 9-12 (1987). 
92. Seegenerally J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance - A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 
55 (1989). 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 821B cmts. a, d (1979). 
94. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). See afso Mugler, 123 U.S. at 660-61 
("Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere . . . . Under 
our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government."). 
95. For example, public nuisances affecting public health (such as maintaining "foul and 
unhealthy" swampy land or polluting public water supplies) are encompassed in public 
health regulations. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 3 25-43 (West 1990), CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. 3 19a-212 (West 1986). Public nuisances affecting public comfort, such as op- 
erating noisome businesses near highways, might be dealt with as health offenses (e.g., 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAIV 3 1300-a (McKinney 1990)) or  through segregation of incompati- 
ble uses under zoning regulations. 
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able by the state.g6 The courts long ago relinquished their origi- 
nal dominant role in defining public nuisances; as society's 
malefactors discovered ever new kinds of mischief to plague the 
rest of us, it generally has fallen to legislatures to keep the law of 
nuisance up to 
Even before the modern criminal law codifications, legislatures 
have traditionally had authority to add new kinds of public mis- 
chief to the list of public nuisances.98 One of the first legislated 
public nuisances was an Elizabethan regulation forbidding cot- 
tages to be built on rural lots of fewer than four acres freehold.99 
Violations of the London building code of 1666 are another ex- 
ample of early public nuisances.100 
Following the American Revolution, state legislatures assumed 
the role in the United States that Parliament had played in Eng- 
land as the principal legislators in the public nuisance field. 
Though today the legislature usually declares public harms to be 
illegal without actually denominating them as "public nuisances," 
the principle is the same. As for the constitutional validity of leg- 
islated additions to the public nuisance list, the Supreme Court 
held, when the question first arose a century ago, that "all prop- 
erty in this country is held under the implied obligation that the 
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."101 
The Court later added that it is "clearly within the police power 
of the State . . . 'to declare that in particular circumstances and in 
particular localities a [use affecting the "health and comfort of the 
community"] shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law.' "lo2 
The Court recognized, in short, that legislatures must be able 
to withdraw prior existing rights to harm others and to reset the 
thresholds of "nuisance" as new conditions arise. To hold other- 
96. For example, a violation of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act is a misdemeanor 
punishable by fine or  imprisonment or  both. STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT 5 8 (U.S. 
Dept of Commerce, rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUN- 
NINGHAM, PUNNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 168-72 (3d ed. 1990). 
97. In fact, it has been said that "to the extent that public nuisance is still a crime, it is 
codified by statute and does not exist in the common law." Abrams & Washington, supra 
note 80, at 365. 
98. See generally Spencer, supra note 92. 
99. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 67. at *168. 
100. Act for Rebuilding the City of London, 1666, 19 Car. 2, ch. 3, I11 (Eng.), reprinted in 
8 DANBY PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE 233,234 (Cambridge University, London, 1763). 
101. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887). 
102. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394. 41 1 (1915) (quoting Reinman v. City of 
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915)) (emphasis added). 
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wise would deny state legislatures vital authority to respond to 
change. Accordingly, even though property ownership must, as a 
practical matter, involve incidental rights to cause external harms, 
such rights to harm others have long been subject to legislative 
redefinition.103 
In its 1922 landmark opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon,104 however, the Court introduced a now oft-quoted ca- 
veat: "[Wlhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."l05 
Although the Court did not say in Mahon exactly how far is "too 
far," it held that the Pennsylvania legislature had overstepped the 
line by enacting a law forbidding people from removing coal from 
under other people's houses.106 In striking down Pennsylvania's 
law, the Court affirmed that there are, to quote Lucas, "limits to 
the noncompensable exercise of the police power."107 
Loath to "nullify" this "affirmation of limits,"lOs the Court in 
Lucas chose instead to solidify and entrench Mahon's truncation of 
elected legislatures' centuries-old authority. As support for such 
a distribution of institutional power the Court cited a "historic 
compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of 
our constitutional culture"10g (as distinguished, apparently, from 
the Takings Clause that the Framers intended to make part of the 
Constitution itsel£)."O In limiting the legislature's power the 
103. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
104. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
105. Id at 415. 
106. Because earlier conveyances had severed the surface rights from the mineral 
rights, the coal and the houses had different owners, and the Pennsylvania law in question 
rendered the mineral rights valueless. However, it was necessary for the coal to remain in 
the ground to prevent the houses on the surface from sinking into subsidence craters. 
107. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886. 2899 (1992). 
108. Id at 2899, 2900 n.15. 
109. Id at 2900. The Court also cited a series of cases beginning in 1980 that have 
repeated the dictum that a compensable taking occurs when a land-use regulation "denies 
an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 2893 (quoting Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) and subsequent cases reiterating the Agins quotation). 
Based upon this oft-repeated Agim dictum, the Court insisted that it did not "invent" the 
Lucar rule for total takings. Id at 2893 n.6. 
Regardless of the genesis of the rule, Luras appears to be the first case actually to hold 
that a particular land use restriction violated the Agim "economically viable use" criterion. 
Before Lucus thus elevated dictum to holding, the question was open whether the Takings 
Clause really gives owners a minimum, inviolable economic guarantee. 
110. As far as the historical evidence reveals, the Takings Clause was not originally in- 
tended to apply to mere restrictions on use. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Note. The 
Origins and Original Signyicance of the Just Compensation Clause of the F$h Amendment, 94 YALE 
Heinonline - -  18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 19 1993 
Court made it a certainty that at least some private rights to harm 
others will now be constitutionally inviolable. 1 
Even with its theoretically narrow application to "relatively rare 
situations,""2 the Lucas-Mahon truncation of legislative authority 
may have some wider implications. For instance, it is possible 
that Lucas is only the beginning of a trend towards greater protec- 
tion of property owners from public interest legislation.l13 An 
LJ. 694, 71 1 (1985). Certainly no such intention was reflected in the legal institutions of 
our country's formative years. See Scott M. Reznick, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Con- 
cept of Takings in 19th Century America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854 (1973). As late as 1897, the 
Supreme Court still firmly believed, based on an "immense weight of authority," that tak- 
ing required a "physical invasion of the real estate." Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 
269,275-76 (1897) ("[Alcts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not 
directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, 
are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision." 
(emphasis added) (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,642 (1878))). The 
true origin of the regulatory takings law is Justice Holmes's bold and brilliantjudicial activ- 
ism in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), see supra text accompanying 
notes 104-06. 
The majority opinion in Lucar conceded that it "is correct that early constitutional theo- 
rists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all . . . ." 
Lucar, 112 S .  Ct. at 2900 n.15. However, it dismissed these earlier understandings as "en- 
tirely irrelevant" in light of Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) 
(extending the application of the Takings Clause to the states) and Pennsylvania Coal, 260 
U.S. 393 (first recognizing the regulatory taking concept). These two cases seem to be the 
location of the majority's "historic compact," assuming it is located anywhere at all. 
11 1. Except, of course, if the public is willing to pay the harmdoer to refrain from com- 
mitting the harm. 
112. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894. 
113. "This issue 'is the new frontier in property law,' " according to Scott Bullock, an 
attorney for the Institute ofJustice, which filed an amicus brief in Lucar urging an expansion 
of property owners' rights under the takings clause. Yang with Hong, supra note 27, at 31. 
Yang and Hong also reported that "property-rights activists plan to test how far the court 
is willing to carry its logic." Id. 
A recent announcement by the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy refers to the 
"growing number of owners who have organized under various banners, including the 
controversial Wise Use movement. Employing a strategy of selective litigation combined 
with grass roots lobbyingand public relations campaigns, Wise Use activists and others are 
seeking compensation when government restrains the use of their land. The Lucas deci- 
sion signals that these efforts are paying off." Mark Pollot Availabk for Interview and Commen- 
tary, PR NEIVSWIRE, June 29, 1992, availabk in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File. 
As of early 1992, almost 200 takings claims were pending in the United State Claims 
Court, including challenges to the government's authority to "clean up toxic wastes, regu- 
late grazing and water rights, buy land for national parks, restrict mining in wild areas and 
set aside private land to protect wetlands." Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face a Stlf 
Test from Landowners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al. The results of some recent cases 
brought in that court have, arguably, been more favorable to landowners than can be justi- 
fied by a reading of past Supreme Court decisions on segmentation (see infra text accompa- 
nying notes 117-20). See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 161 (1990) 
(wetland protection); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990) (wet- 
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obvious way to extend the Lucas holding would be simply to relax 
the requirement of "total taking." A rule giving compensation 
for less-than-100% value reductions would, however, present dif- 
ficult issues of line drawing (and, in the process, become a fertile 
source of litigation). Anyway, the Lucas majority seemed uncon- 
cerned that singling out "total takings" gives a weird talismanic 
significance to the last few percentage points of value affected by 
a regulation. As it noted (with a less-than-keen sense of equity): 
"Takings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations."ll* 
A more conservative approach to extending Lucas might involve 
increasing the number of situations that are deemed to fall within 
the "total takings" zone. There is nothing self-evident about 
when a use restriction takes "all economically beneficial use.""5 
For example, can a use that provides only below-market rates of 
return still be considered "economically beneficial"? Most busi- 
ness people would probably say no. On the other hand, the "eco- 
nomically beneficial" concept cannot be logically tied to rates of 
return without making the whole analysis circular, since rates of 
return depend on market values, while market values depend on 
rates of return. A further problem is that, if owners are constitu- 
tionally guaranteed some minimum "rate" of return, private mar- 
ket transactions will ratchet up constitutionally assured minimum 
uses of land.116 
Another approach to increasing the number of situations that 
fall in the "total takings" zone, and one in which the Lucas major- 
ity showed some interest, is to eliminate or cut back on the "no- 
segmentation" rule, which provides: 
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into dis- 
crete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, 
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action 
land protection); see also Whitney Benefits. Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (strip mining in alluvial valley floor). 
See also Charles P. Alexander, Gunning For the Greens, TIME, Feb. 3, 1992, at 70; H. Jane 
Lehman, Landowners Go lo Court lo Fight for Properly Rights, WASH. Pos~.Jan. 4, 1992, at El; 
David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Pay Me or Get Off My Land. NEWSWEEK, March 9, 1992. at 70. 
114. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
115. "Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible 
use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property 
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." Lucac, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. 
116. See my earlier discussion of this subject in John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land 
Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 360-65 (1989). 
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and on the nature of the interference with rights in thparcel as a 
whole . . . . 117 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this rule, es- 
pecially after Lucas. It is largely because of no-segmentation that 
total regulatory takings are, as the Court observed, "relatively 
rare."l18 Many millions of acres of America's important natural 
resource lands - wetlands, coastlands, reservoir watersheds, 
stream corridors, endangered species habitats - have little com- 
mercial value in their natural condition. These same lands, how- 
ever, have great market value potential if their natural features 
can be degraded or destroyed by development. After Lucas, regu- 
latory protection of these vulnerable portions of our national 
landbase depends on their being joined in larger parcels that have 
substantial value "as a whole." 
Although the no-segmentation rule has been a constitutional 
fixture for nearly as long as the Mahon truncation that it qualifies, 
the Court's opinion in Lucas exhibits a marked lack of enthusiasm 
for the rule.119 Despite the rule's explicitness, the majority found 
its application to be "unclear7': 
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we 
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been 
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened 
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a 
mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.120 
The opinion also dismissed the several post-Mahon cases applying 
the rule as "inconsistent pronouncements" by the Court.121 It 
seems a fair surmise that some of the Justices, at least, have seri- 
ous doubts about the rule itself. An "Imperial Judiciary" would 
have no difficulty extending Lucas by contracting "no-segmenta- 
tion," but institutional considerations counsel against doing 
so. 
117. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1987) (quot- 
ing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)). 
118. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
119. Chief Justice Rehnquist's earlier opinions have evinced a similar skepticism about 
the no-segmentation rule. See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 515-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent- 
ing); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 142-43, 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
120. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2894 n.7 (1992) (empha- 
sis added). 
121. Id. 
122. On its first day in session after rendering the Luras decision, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in a case that would have raised the "no-segmentation" rule directly. 
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IV. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION A D THE REVISION 
OF LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENTS 
It is, as stated earlier, a perennial question of legal policy to 
determine which interference-producing uses of land should be 
tolerated and which, on balance, ought to be banned. There is a 
separate and essentially constitutional question: Which part of the 
government should be doing the balancing and making the sub- 
stantive decisions about land-use rights and wrongs? 
Our nation's constitutional tradition is clear: "Power to deter- 
mine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere . . . . 
Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch 
of the government."123 "[Alnd in this particular a large discre- 
tion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only 
what the interests of the public require, but what measures are 
necessary for the protection of such interests."124 Nevertheless, a 
legislature's own "determination as to what is a proper exercise 
of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the 
supervision of the The proper scope for this judicial 
supervision of legislatures is the crux of the "regulatory takings" 
issue. 
In recent years, regulatory takings review has sometimes been 
treated as an occasion forjudges to rethink, ad hoc, the purposes 
and means that the legislature has selected - turning the ques- 
tion of legislative authority into a rebalancing of the relevant in- 
terests to see if the legislature's land-use regulation was a sound 
policy choice.lZ6 For the most part, since the repudiation of the 
Tull v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). The state had denied the owner of a 43-acre site a 
permit to fill the approximately two acres of wetlands on the site. Tull v. Virginia (Cir. Ct. 
Accomack County Va. Nov. 4, 1991), petitionfor cert.filed 61 U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Sept. 8, 
1992) (No. 92-112) ("Question presented: Does Fifth Amendment allow denial of just 
compensation by including non-regulated upland property into 'relevant calculus,' when 
just compensation would be required if 'parcel as a whole' were limited to regulated wet- 
lands and permit denial prohibited all economic viable use of wetland property that must 
remain forever in its natural state?'). 
123. hfugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887). 
124. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). 
125. Id at 137. 
126. The "determination that governmental action constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a 
determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of 
an exercise of state power in the public interest," a question that "necessarily requires a 
weighing of private and public interests." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 
Heinonline - -  18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 23 1993 
Lochner line of cases in the late 1 9 3 0 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  the Supreme Court's 
decisions have not supported such judicial second-guessing in the 
economic sphere.128 Beyond assuring that legislative purposes 
fall within a "broad range" of legitimacy129 and that the means 
selected are rational,l30 the courts have been largely deferential 
in a regulatory takings review. 
By making the common law of nuisance a criterion for legisla- 
tive validity, however, the Supreme Court has read the Takings 
Clause as a warrant for courts to substitute their own substantive 
judgments about land-use rights and wrongs in place of those of 
the legislature. At least in cases of "total takings," Lucas directs 
the courts to establish limits on the legislature's authority by re- 
weighing the very same sorts of factors that the legislature itself 
should have considered when deciding whether to enact the chal- 
lenged law. In applying the common-law nuisance criterion, the 
question for the courts is not whether the legislature proceeded 
in a rational way towards a proper objective. It is whether the 
legislature reached the right conclusion. 
In evaluating this assignment of ultimate land-use authority to 
the courts, it is not enough to observe that the legislative process 
can sometimes result in unjust burdens to private owners. While 
legislatures cannot always be relied on to provide perfectly "just" 
results, neither can courts - a choice between an imperfect dem- 
480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 
255. 261 (1980)). 
For an example of explicit judicial replication of the legislative weighing process, see 
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States. 21 C1. Ct. 161, 166-68 (1990). 
127. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a labor standards law on 
substantive due process grounds). By 1938, the Court had made it clear that due process 
protections were, at least in regard to economic legislation, not a basis for courts to sec- 
ond-guess the wisdom of legislative judgments. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[Rlegulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions 
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude 
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis . . . ."). See also, e.g., Pennell v. City of 
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding rent control); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 
(1987) (stating that legislative acts must be reviewed under a "rational basis" standard); 
Day-Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952) ("We do not sit as a super- 
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation . . . ."). 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 45-54. 
129. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987). 
130. Judicial "inquiry into legislative purpose is not intended as a license to judge the 
effectiveness of legislation," the sole constitutional question on review being whether the 
"Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective." Kq- 
stone, 480 U.S. at 511 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)). 
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ocratic process and an imperfect non-democratic one. The ques- 
tion is this: As social norms, knowledge, and context shift over 
time, which institution is better suited to weigh and reweigh the 
many competing interests, public and private, and keep the laws 
attuned to the times? 
There are good reasons why the final authority to fix and revise 
the optimal balance in the land-use field has historically been left 
to legislators. Legislatures are set up to address complex issues 
comprehensively, to deal with diverse interrelated issues 
programmatically, and to codify rather than merely to decide con- 
troversies case by case.13' Unlike judges, moreover, legislators 
face frequent re-elections and constant constituent contact. But 
most importantly, access to legislators is a legitimate right of eve- 
ryone who cares about the policy choices being made. Courts, by 
contrast, are purposely insulated from such a diversity of views. 
No matter how widespread the potential impact of a pending 
case, only the parties to the litigation have the right to address the 
judge, or provide perspective on the issues. 
In short, legislatures are generally far better positioned than 
the judicial branch to exercise that "large discretion . . . to deter- 
mine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what 
131. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.. 257 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y. 1970) (declining to 
enjoin an air pollution source on the ground (among others) that courts should not try, 
"as a by-product of private litigation. . . to lay down and implement an effective policy for 
the elimination of air pollution," explaining that "the judicial establishment is neither 
equipped . . . nor prepared" to do so). 
In their review of "judicial zoning" referred to earlier. Beuscher and Momson noted 
that judge-made criteria for resolving land use conflicts "show the extreme difficulty of 
choosing, through the individualized process of case law, between clashing land uses that 
exist in bewildering variety." Beuscher & Momson, supra note 34, at 442-43. While com- 
mon law nuisance criteria can work fairly effectively in areas that have already acquired a 
homogeneous developed character, courts "hesitate to forecast the land use future" of 
mixed use districts and "are apt to stand aside and let topsy-like growth run its course." 
Id. at 447. Thus, it is seldom possible to obtain an advance injunction prohibiting the 
establishment of a specific use threatening to be a nuisance because, as one court put it, if 
the use were " 'restrained in the first instance, we could never learn from the great teacher 
experience, whether [it] would, in fact, be a nuisance or not.' " Oechsle v. Ruhl, 54 A.2d 
462,467 (N.J. 1947) (quoting Duncan v. Hayes &Greenwood, 22 N.J. Eq. 25,28 (1871)). 
Another consequence of the courts' case-by-case approach is that it leaves the common 
law of nuisance almost powerless to deal with subtle, long-range cumulative deleterious 
impacts. For example, the extension of suburban sprawl into a public reservoir watershed 
can ultimately destroy the reservoir's water quality, but each individual new house contrib- 
utes so imperceptibly to the problem that it does not seem to be a "nuisance" in itself. Cf: 
s u p  not; 87 (discussing the legislature's ability to address subtle, long-term resource 
degradation). 
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measures are necessary for the protection of such interests."ls2 
This is especially so in the economic sphere, where "the fact is 
that virtually all economic regulation benefits some segments of 
the society and harms others."l33 
The "reality [is] that determination of 'the public interest' in 
the manifold areas of government regulation entails not merely 
economic and mathematical analysis but value judgment . . . ."134 
If legislative decisions to regulate objectionable land uses are 
"made subject to wcpost facto judicial assessment of 'the public in- 
terest,' with personal liability of city officials a possible conse- 
quence, [the Supreme Court] will have gone far to compromise 
the States' ability to regulate their domestic commerce"135 and, 
one might add, to protect the viability of their domestic landbase. 
A reviewing court may or may not agree that a particular legis- 
lative land-use restriction is justified by the potentially deleterious 
external impacts that it averts, or that the economic impact on 
private owners is justified. The question is how far the Takings 
Clause should be diverted from its historic purposels6 and read as 
a license for courts to substitute their de novo determinations on 
these points for those of the legislatures elected by the people.ls7 
132. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133. 136 (1894). 
133. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991) 
(Scalia, J.), 
Occasionally, of course, judicial review of legislative acts may provide appropriate occa- 
sions for substantive decision-making. Review of legislation that appears to impinge upon 
"fundamental rights," a situation in which the democratic processes may be especially dis- 
trusted, is an example of such an occasion. 
The subject of "fundamental rights" is far outside the scope of this article, but it is 
noted in passing that rights to make particular uses of property do not at all fit the mold of 
"fundamental rights." A typical characteristic of a fundamental right (such as free expres- 
sion and voting) is that everyone can enjoy the full exercise of the right without interfering 
appreciably with the full and equal exercise of the right by everyone else. Property rights 
do not possess this characteristic: each person's use of property all too frequently conflicts 
and interferes, to some extent, with other people's uses of their property. If X is accorded 
a "fundamental" right to use his property as a family residence, then next-door neighbor Y 
plainly cannot have a "fundamental" right to use her property as a steel mill, or vice versa. 
A related point is that "fundamental rights" are distributed equally (or they ought to 
be). Property rights, by contrast, are not distributed equally, making it doubtful that they 
are (or ought to be) the subject of a "fundamental" constitutional guarantee. 
134. Omni Outdoor, 11 1 S. Ct. at 1352. 
135. Id (citing Southern Motor Camers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 
U.S. 48 (1985)). 
136. As noted earlier, the available historical evidence indicates that the Takings Clause 
was not intended to apply to use restrictions at all. See supra note 110. 
137. In adumbrating a far more fitting role for the courts in regulatory takings cases, 
Professor Farber recently described the Takings Clause as "a method of universalizing the 
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The regulatory takings debate is not really about property 
rights, their sanctity, or the appropriateness of governmental lim- 
its on their exercise. It is not, in its essence, a debate about pri- 
vate owner sovereignty as opposed to governmental sovereignty 
over the land of the United States.138 It is, more fundamentally, 
an institutional debate as to which branch of government should 
have the final say on the substantive issues of land-use regulation. 
For a "relatively rare" group of cases, at least, the Supreme Court 
has resolved that question in favor of the judiciary by elevating 
the common law of nuisance to a position of unprecedented con- 
stitutional importance. 
The holding of Lucas is narrow, and its substantive effects will 
be easy enough for legislatures to avoid. By creating procedures 
for "hardship variances" for owners who can prove total takings, 
governmental entities should be able to avoid liability even for 
"temporary regulatory takings."ls9 The integrity of programs to 
protect low market-value natural resource lands can be largely 
maintained as well. By judicious use of "subdivision regulations" 
to prevent sensitive lands from being severed from their build- 
able neighbors, parcels that contain sensitive lands can retain 
their "economically beneficial use" viewed "as a whole," preclud- 
usual practice of government compensation for certain losses." Daniel A. Farber, Public 
Choice andJust Compensation. 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279,303 (1992). His conception of the 
just-compensation requirement as essentially a "trade usage" law is potent, both as a mat- 
ter of explanation and legal prescription. Id. at 298-99. Recognizing that elected legisla- 
tures are normally motivated to provide compensation in a variety of circumstances, he 
argues that the key role of the constitutional requirement is to "make the compensation 
practice uniform" - to prevent the stochastic injustice of occasional compensation denials 
in circumstances where compensation usually is granted. Id  at 299. Thus, instead of me- 
diating the great social debates about the ideal roles of private property and community 
self-protection programs, courts would leave such questions to elected legislatures, confin- 
ing themselves to ensuring that the legislative balancing process - whatever it is - is 
fairly and consistently applied. 
Indeed, Professor Farber's argument could be taken even further, assimilating takings 
jurisprudence to the law of private property generally. Are not all laws protecting private 
property (such as laws prohibiting trespass and burglary) essentially like trade usage law. 
enforcing against occasional opportunistic disregard of the deference that most people 
give to other people's possession anyway? 
138. These are very important matters, of course, but they are not at the essence of the 
regulatory takings debate. 
139. The Court has held that a use restriction that eliminates "all use" of ~rivate land 
entitles the owner to compensation for the resultant "temporary taking" even if the gov- 
ernment later repeals the offending law. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). The Court emphasized, however, that its holding did not 
apply to "normal delays in obtaining. . . variances, and the like." Id  at 321. 
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ing the need for excessive use of variances.140 Perhaps the easiest 
way to inoculate land-use laws against Lucas will be to create lim- 
ited systems of transferable development rights so that no prop- 
erty in land could ever be considered entirely without 
economically beneficial use.141 
Narrow and easily avoidable or not, however, even a partial re- 
duction of traditional legislative authority is cause for concern. 
Each time it happens, as the Lucas author stated in another case, 
"the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of 
that eminent tribunal."l4* And as the Supreme Court itself cau- 
tioned at another time, "one branch of the government cannot 
encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of 
our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance 
of this salutary rule."l43 
Societal regulation of intolerable behavior, in connection with 
land use and otherwise, cannot be a fixed set of rules, but must 
evolve with the times. Legislative additions to the common law of 
nuisance have been a primary mechanism for keeping land-use 
law up to date. In apparent response to sentiment for reining in 
legislatures' broad traditional discretion, however, the Supreme 
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council erected a new "cate- 
gorical" rule of takings for the "relatively rare situations" of "to- 
tal takings" of "all economically beneficial use." 
The Lucas case was presented as a takings case, but the 
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the land-use regula- 
140. Of course, this strategy of keeping sensitive lands united in ownership with adja- 
cent reasonably buildable lands will only work to the extent that the no-segmentation rule 
remains in place. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20. 
As noted earlier, since Luras, the Court has already denied certiorari in a case that would 
have raised the "no-segmentation" rule directly. See supra note 122. 
141. I have, in another article, discussed the possible constitutional infirmity of transfer- 
able development rights systems where the connection between the sending and receiving 
parcels is not sufficiently close. Humbach, supra note 116, at 352 n.39. 
142. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), 
reprinted in Inaugural Addresses of the Presihts of the United States, S. Doc. No. 10, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. 139 (1989)). 
143. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888). Accord Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (stating that the judiciary must avoid "taking to itself authority to 
govern the country without express constitutional authority"). 
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tion at issue was a taking. Instead, it created an enclave of legisla- 
tive impotence in a field where the policy choices of the people's 
elected representatives had previously reigned supreme. Uses of 
land inevitably come into conflict with one another and with other 
important values, and hard choices inevitably must be made. The 
Lucas truncation of legislatures' powers to make these choices is, 
at the least, a questionable reassignment of institutional 
authority. 
Heinonline - -  18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 29 1993 
